Doing global investments the Nordic way. The "business case" for Equinor’s support to union work among its employees in Tanzania by Lange, Siri
Focaal—Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology 88 (2020): 22–39
© Th e Author
doi:10.3167/fcl.2020.880102
Doing global investments the Nordic way
Th e “business case” for Equinor’s support to union work 
among its employees in Tanzania
Siri Lange
Abstract: In the Nordic countries, unions are represented in company boards and 
can infl uence companies’ policies toward labor abroad. Th is article focuses on the 
Norwegian national oil company Equinor and its support of unionization of its 
employees in Tanzania. Th is was inspired by the Nordic tradition of social dialogue 
between corporations and strong, independent unions. Corporation managers 
and union representatives tend to refer to this social dialogue as “the Norwegian 
model,” but this is a narrow conceptualization of the model that disregards the role 
of the state. I argue that while it is benefi cial for the Tanzanian workers to be orga-
nized, it is probably also “good for business” to have unionized workers who have 
adopted the Nordic collaborative model, rather than a more radical union model.
Keywords: CSR, extractive sector, industrial relations, labor rights, oil and gas, 
petroleum, Tanzania, trade unions
Multinational corporations (MNCs) engaged 
in resource extraction in the Global South have 
been heavily criticized. One response by MNCs 
has been to formulate corporate social responsi-
bility (CSR) strategies (Gilberthorpe and Rajak 
2017). CSR is essentially a concept embedded in 
US capitalism and is seen by most companies as 
being “good for business” (Harvey et al. 2017; 
Knudsen, Rajak, et al. this issue). Anthropol-
ogists have argued that CSR is oft en designed 
“to give an image of morality” (Rajak 2011b), 
and Catherine Dolan and Dinah Rajak suggest 
that we see CSR as “an evolving and fl exible and 
overlapping set of practices and discourses . . . 
through which business (re)makes and asserts 
itself as an ethical actor” (2011: 5–6).
National oil companies control 80 percent 
of the global oil resources (ILO 2009), but until 
now, the majority of studies of oil and gas com-
panies and their conduct abroad have looked 
to privately owned companies (Frynas 2009). 
Th ere is a need to expand the study of MNCs 
that are engaged in resource extraction to also 
include national oil companies. Th is article 
looks at the case of Equinor, an MNC that orig-
inated as a Norwegian national oil company, 
and their eff orts, in collaboration with a Nor-
wegian union, to support union work among its 
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employees in Tanzania. Up to now, few scholars 
of CSR have looked at the relationship between 
CSR and labor rights, or CSR and unions (Har-
vey et al. 2017: 43). 
In a comparative study of unions in Europe, 
the authors found that Nordic Union represen-
tatives are generally skeptical of the concept of 
CSR, and push for formal General Framework 
Agreements (GFAs) rather than voluntary and 
informal CSR. Th e authors also argue that in 
contrast to European and global NGOs, which 
may spread negative information about com-
panies, unions in Europe are concerned about 
protecting jobs and therefore do not wish to un-
dermine corporate reputations (Rees et al. 2014: 
12). 
In Norway, the relationship between Equi-
nor, and the union where the majority of the 
employees are organized, Industri Energi, is 
very close, and the Union branch at Equinor 
Norway has a more infl uential role than what 
is commonly found in MNCs. In contrast to 
most other countries, trade unions in Norway 
have certain mandatory and codifi ed rights, and 
therefore a strong legitimate status (Løken and 
Barbosa 2008; Rees et al. 2014). Th e reason for 
this is the tripartite system: the formalized and 
strictly regulated interaction between corpo-
rations, trade unions, and the government in 
Norway. 
Th e tripartite system is oft en referred to as 
the Nordic model, and the defi ning characteris-
tic of the model is the “infl uence that the labor 
movement has on capital and the state” (Knud-
sen, Rajak, et al. this issue). Th is is a result of 
specifi c economic and political developments 
that took place in the interwar period, and the 
Nordic countries share some characteristics, in-
cluding egalitarian traditions, the welfare state, 
and “labour market politics and regulations” 
(Ervasti et al. 2008: 3).
Th e Nordic model and the Norwegian model 
are terms that are oft en used interchangeably by 
scholars who study Norwegian industrial rela-
tions. Espen Løken and Freitas Barbosa state 
that these two concepts are not well defi ned, 
but that six characteristics are oft en empha-
sized when the Nordic or Norwegian model is 
described: “Universal welfare arrangements and 
a large public sector; high employment, among 
both men and women; small wage diff erences 
and a large degree of social mobility; strong col-
lective actors; both centrally coordinated wage 
formation and local bargaining at company 
level; close cooperation between the govern-
ment, employers’ associations and trade unions 
as well as strong co-determination and partic-
ipation at company level” (Løken and Barbosa 
2008: 13).
In this article, I demonstrate that both the 
Norwegian management of Equinor and the 
Norwegian union and branch representatives 
tend to emphasize a very narrow aspect of what 
scholars and many politicians alike consider to 
be the Nordic model. Some corporation manag-
ers and union representatives equate what they 
refer to as “the Norwegian model” with a close 
relationship between managers and staff  based 
on cooperation and dialogue (related to the 
sixth point on the list above), and they appar-
ently disregard the other characteristics.
I argue that Equinor’s eff ort to support union 
work at its offi  ce in Tanzania is a result of the 
company’s genuine belief that cooperation with 
trade unions is “good for business,” but also that 
the company’s relatively substantial support of 
union work was the result of two coincidences. 
First, the union members of the Equinor board 
visited Tanzania and encouraged the staff  to 
unionize. Second, an independent splinter union, 
National Union of Mine and Energy Workers of 
Tanzania (NUMET), had recently been estab-
lished in Tanzania and had already attempted to 
recruit the staff . I show that the eff orts to estab-
lish a local branch caused clashes and confl icts 
between the branch and the management, as 
well as between the branch members. 
Several authors have emphasized that there is 
considerable diversity in trade unionism, both 
within and between countries (Harvey et al. 
2017: 45; Tran et al. 2017). Th ey have therefore 
argued for the importance of understanding 
labor struggles and unions “within their polit-
ical and historical context” (Neve 2008: 214). I 
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show how Tanzanian labor history, combined 
with the extremely asymmetrical relationship 
both between the Norwegian and the Tanzanian 
union and between the management and staff  at 
the Equinor offi  ce in Tanzania, infl uenced the 
local union branch and led to the adoption of 
a model in which good collaboration with the 
management is listed as the union’s highest goal. 
Th e article is based on ten shorter fi eld trips 
in Norway (Oslo, Stavanger, and Bergen) and 
eight in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam, Lindi, Mtwara, 
and Mwanza) over a period of four years (Jan-
uary 2016 to December 2019). I wanted to un-
derstand the interrelationship between diff erent 
levels/strands of the company both horizontally 
(between workers or union representatives in 
Norway and Tanzania) and vertically (between 
company leadership and union representatives 
in both countries). 
During this fi eldwork, I visited Equinor of-
fi ces, union headquarters, other civil society 
organizations, and the proposed site for a Liq-
uefi ed Natural Gas (LNG) plant. I held meet-
ings and/or interviews in English, Norwegian, 
or Swahili with a large number of Equinor staff  
and branch and union leaders in Norway and 
Tanzania, including two Equinor board mem-
bers, three diff erent country managers of Equi-
nor Tanzania, and top union leaders in both 
countries.1 
Th e corporate context restricted the degree 
of participant observation as Equinor offi  ces are 
under strict surveillance in both Norway and 
Tanzania. One can only enter the premises by 
invitation, entrance requires digital registration 
and one must carry a visitor’s tag visible at all 
times. Employees at the Oslo offi  ces, somewhat 
embarrassedly, admitted that they had been in-
structed to restrict visitors from leaving meeting 
rooms alone and, if required, to escort visitors 
to the bathroom and wait outside. Th us, I have 
limited ethnography of the day-to-day union 
work. Unstructured interviews, documents that 
branch leaders have shared with me, as well as 
follow-up conversations via email and phone/
skype are therefore the main sources of infor-
mation for this article. 
Th e article is organized as follows: the fi rst 
section comprises a literature review covering 
corporate social responsibility, the role of NGOs 
and unions, transnational labor activism, and 
traveling models. Th e second section provides 
background information about Equinor and its 
relationship to labor both in Norway and in a 
few other countries in which it operates. Th e 
third section starts with some background in-
formation about the company’s investments in 
Tanzania before I describe in depth the process 
of building up a local union branch at Equinor 
Tanzania, the confl icts that arose, and the out-
come. In the concluding remarks, I argue that 
while the Norwegian industrial relations that 
entail close collaboration between business and 
trade unions was born through confl ict, the 
Norwegian union Industri Energi,2 which orga-
nizes most of the “blue collar” workers in the oil 
and gas sector in Norway, off ers a relatively ahis-
torical message to their “partners” in the Global 
South that cooperation is the way to go, and this 
has been adopted locally. If Equinor invests in 
Tanzania and hires thousands of employees, it 
will be “good for business” to have union lead-
ership in place that sees good collaboration with 
the management as a central goal.
CSR and transnational labor activism: 
Two disconnected fi elds
Despite an increasing focus on CSR among cor-
porations, a number of ethnographic studies 
have demonstrated that MNCs behave in a way 
with negative consequences for workers, host 
communities, or both (Rajak 2011a; Welker 
2009). NGOs have played a central role both as 
“watchdogs” and partners in relation to CSR. A 
relatively large body of literature looks at how 
various stakeholders pressure companies to 
adopt specifi c policies. As Michael Gold, Lutz 
Preuss, and Chris Rees emphasize, however, “it 
is striking that trade unions play a limited role 
in the literature on CSR,” and while “workers 
are oft en the addressees of CSR activists, their 
infl uence on shaping CSR and how CSR aff ects 
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their well-being are rarely studied” (Gold et al. 
2020: 136). Similarly, overviews of anthropolog-
ical work on CSR show that labor rights and the 
role of unions have received limited attention 
(Dolan and Rajak 2011: 2; Spencer 2018; Welker 
et al. 2011).
Sabrina Zajak and her co-authors’ review of 
the literature on how transnational advocacy 
networks support domestic struggles of labor 
show that “trade unions are no longer viewed 
as a central player” (Zajak et al. 2017: 903, 916), 
and Mark Anner found that in the cases where 
unions do take part in voluntary social compli-
ance programs, the programs have limited eff ect 
in labor repressive regimes (Anner 2017). 
In contrast to other stakeholders, trade unions 
are “once and the same time internal stake hold-
ers . . . and external stakeholders” (Harvey et al. 
2017: 45). Despite their role in CSR policies in 
coordinated market economies, as in the Nordic 
countries and Germany, the role of unions and 
work councils have been almost ignored (Gold 
et al. 2020; Scholz and Vitols 2019: 237). How-
ever, in many European countries, workers are 
represented on company boards, and unions 
can therefore potentially infl uence companies’ 
CSR policies. 
In Norway, employees were given the right to 
be represented on corporative boards by a 1972 
amendment of the Companies Act (Heiret 2012: 
52). In 1980, the principle of bedrift sdemokrati 
(corporate democracy) was included in the 
Nor wegian Constitution. As a result of the in-
creasing internationalization of Norwegian cor-
porations in the 1990s and 2000s, the Norwegian 
confederation of trade unions (LO-Norway; 
Landsorganisasjonen i Norge) set up a network 
for union representatives at the corporate level 
(konserntillitsvalgte), and published a book that 
aims to give Norwegian union representatives in 
multinational companies some tools to handle 
CSR in their own corporations (Granden 2009).
In the German context, workers’ representa-
tion on boards is referred to as “shared gover-
nance” or “codetermination” (Jäger et al. 2019). 
Robert Schols and Sigurt Vitols found that in 
Germany, union representation on boards pos-
itively aligns with substantive CSR, like “emis-
sions reduction, the publication of a CSR report 
and commitment to employment security,” but 
not with symbolic CSR, like being a signatory 
to the UN Global Compact (Scholz and Vitols 
2019: 244). Scholz and Vitols do not look spe-
cifi cally at how codetermination aff ects how the 
companies relate to labor abroad. However, Za-
jak and her co-authors, argue that the involve-
ment of international labor rights organizations 
“[aiming at] strengthening local trade unions 
can produce detrimental eff ects by disempow-
ering more radical and independent unions,” 
thereby delegitimizing radical strategies (Zajak 
et al. 2017: 908,911). Camilla Houeland de-
scribes radical unions as unions that see “their 
role as part of a larger class alliance in confl ict 
with the state and capitalist system,” while re-
formist unions “emphasise social dialogue 
mechanisms” (Houeland 2018: 106). Some have 
argued that in coordinated market economies 
(like the Nordic countries and Germany) part-
nership and social dialogue may work, but that 
it would be far more problematic in liberal mar-
ket economies (Gold et al. 2020).
In this article, I explore the process whereby a 
Norwegian union branch acted as a mediator in 
the process of establishment of a union branch 
in Tanzania. In a recent edited volume on Trav-
elling Models in global processes, Andrea Beh-
rends, Sung-Joon Park, and Richard Rottenburg 
emphasize that rationalities are “embedded in 
particular epistemic communities as well as in 
institutional and material networks and are in-
separable parts of these multilayered networks, 
which generated them,” but it is only the “objec-
tifi ed model” that travels, the rest stays behind 
(Behrends et al. 2014: 2).  
Tanzanians have ample experience with trav-
eling models. By 2012, Tanzania was the coun-
try in sub-Saharan Africa that had historically 
received the second largest amount of aid, sur-
passed only by Ethiopia (Tripp 2012). As Beh-
rends and her co-authors point out, and which 
I have demonstrated in an earlier work on Tan-
zania (Lange 2008), models oft en come “to be 
used in ways other than intended” (Behrends et 
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al. 2014: 5). Traveling models, particularly those 
sponsored by aid agencies, rest on a Eurocen-
tric assumption. Simply put, “the West knows 
best” (Sabaratnam 2017: 22). Meera Sabaratnam 
argues that the call for labor rights in interna-
tional CSR discourse is “based on a particular 
conception of state-led social democracy akin 
to the practices in post-war Western Europe” 
(2017: 33). Th is is true for the processes that I 
describe in the coming sections. 
Equinor: Background and 
the relationship to labor
Statoil was established by the Parliament as a 
national oil company (NOC) in 1972. Statoil has 
been described as the Labor Party’s (Arbeider-
partiet) “baby” and has held a central place in 
Norwegian politics since the early 1900s with 
close ties to the labor movement. In the early 
years of Statoil, both the CEO and the chair-
man of the board were labor politicians (Sæther 
2017: 23, 313).
While many other countries started reducing 
state ownership during the 1980s, this did not 
happen in Norway (Knudsen, Rajak, et al. this 
issue). Statoil remained entirely state owned up 
to 2001, when parliament approved the privat-
ization of a third of the shares (Sæther 2017: 
293). Around the same time, Statoil stopped 
using the term “corporate social responsibil-
ity.” CSR was replaced with the term “sustain-
ability.” Th is move was part of an international 
business trend. Hevina Dashwood has doc-
umented how large mining companies in the 
late 1990s “began to frame their CSR policies 
in terms of the global norm of sustainable de-
velopment” (2012). As Knudsen, Rajak, et al. 
make clear, the language shift  “toward ‘sustain-
ability’ and ‘environmental and social gover-
nance’” was also prompted by the fact that to 
“many critics and practitioners alike, CSR re-
tained too much of the philanthropic tradition 
it was meant to replace” (Knudsen, Rajak, et al. 
thus issue).
In May 2018, Statoil changed its name to 
Equinor. According to the company, “Equi” re-
fers to “equal” and “equality” and is linked to the 
company’s Norwegian heritage (Equinor 2018a). 
Equinor currently has operations in more than 
30 countries, and production in approximately 
12, including Angola, Brazil, and Nigeria (Equi-
nor 2018b). Equinor publishes annual Sus-
tainability Reports that cover environmental 
concerns, gender balance among its staff , its 
“social investment projects” in host countries, 
and human rights—including labor rights—for 
its own employees as well as those in the supply 
chain (Equinor 2020a). 
Equinor’s labor relations with their em-
ployees abroad are regulated by a number of 
framework agreements. Th e Industri Energi rep-
resentative on the Equinor board argues that the 
company is “genuinely concerned about having 
strong guidelines. It is a trademark, a reputation 
brand (omdømmemerke), even if we are not so 
big.” In the late 1990s, Equinor was among the 
fi rst companies in the world to have a Global 
Framework Agreement (GFA) with what is now 
the global federation IndustriAll3 (ILO 2009: 
70). According to one of my interlocutors in the 
Equinor branch of Industri Energi, other oil and 
gas companies, like Shell and Esso, “are totally 
against such agreements—they are allergic to it.” 
Th e agreement has been renewed a number of 
times and states that respect for human rights 
includes the “right of every employee to be rep-
resented by a union of his or her choice and the 
basic trade union rights as defi ned by ILO con-
vention 87 and 98” (Industri Energi/IndustriAll 
Global Union and Statoil 2012).
Th e former leader of the Industri Energi 
union holds that the agreement “is worth gold,” 
since it enables the union to force Equinor “to 
meet the unions wherever they are.” Th e pres-
ent leader of the Industri Energi union, who has 
also been the employee representative in the 
Statoil board for two periods, gives the Statoil 
leadership credit for the GFA with IndustryAll: 
“We had people in the Statoil leadership who 
saw that we would internationalize. Th ey saw 
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that if we were to be able to succeed with the 
Norwegian model, to bring it with us abroad, we 
needed that (framework agreement).” She em-
phasizes health, environment, and safety (HES) 
and because Equinor is state owned, it there-
fore has a particular responsibility: “When Sta-
toil was to go abroad on behalf of the state, we 
needed help to get things in order.” While she 
emphasizes HES, when asked what she means 
when she refers to the Norwegian model, she 
answers: 
A model similar to the one that we have 
here: to have dialogue, not confl ict only 
. . . . It means to have a meeting place to 
address challenges within a set frame-
work. Not all cultures have that—a place 
where you can meet the management face 
to face. In many places there are 2–3 levels 
between the employees and the top man-
agement. We want to have the kind of di-
alogue that we have found so useful here 
at home. Th e culture varies—some places 
they say: Wow, are they actually talking 
with the management? We have a meet-
ing point, a place for discussion, a place to 
have a dialogue. And we believe that this 
gives the best results. 
 Her language refl ects a common under-
standing of industrial relations in Norway: the 
focus on dialogue, negotiation, mutual recogni-
tion, cooperation, and compromise (Ihlen and 
Hoivik 2013; Knudsen, Rajak, et al. this issue). 
However, this understanding of the Norwegian 
model is problematic in two ways, particularly 
when it is used to argue for a transfer of the 
model to other countries. First, the emphasis 
on dialogue and cooperation between manag-
ers and employees is presented isolated from 
its historical background—the labor confl icts 
in the interwar period (Ihlen and Hoivik 2013; 
Knudsen, Rajak, et al. this issue). Second, and 
related to the fi rst point, by isolating the em-
ployer–employee relationship from the other 
characteristics of the model that academics see 
as central (Ervasti et al. 2008; Løken and Bar-
bosa 2008), the role of the state is ignored. 
At the human resources department (called 
the Corporate People and Leadership Depart-
ment),4 I was told that “interaction and co-
operation with the employees is part of our 
leadership culture,” but that they follow the 
labor regulations in the countries where they 
operate. Currently, among the countries in the 
Global South where Equinor operates, salaries 
are only negotiated through unions in Brazil 
and Nigeria. However, the Norwegian union In-
dustri Energi is not involved in either of these 
two countries. In the case of Brazil, most unions 
are progressive and militant (Houeland 2018) 
and reportedly do not trust the companies or 
the authorities. According to the union board 
member, “in Brazil the kind of cooperation 
that they have had in Tanzania would not have 
been possible.” In 2017, a Brazilian union leader 
heavily criticized Equinor in a public hearing 
for referring to its social democratic traditions 
when securing licenses, only later to behave like 
any other oil company and earn money on peo-
ple’s misery (Borchrevink 2019: 380). 
In the case of Nigeria, where oil workers’ 
unions have played a critical role in the strug-
gle for democracy (Houeland 2018), there has 
been no cooperation with Norwegian unions. 
My interlocutors in the Industri Energi union 
say that Equinor (then Statoil) branch repre-
sentatives traveled to meet the employees in the 
late 1990s, but they did not succeed in estab-
lishing a platform for cooperation. Since then, 
there has been very limited collaboration with 
Industri Energi. A study of union work among 
oil workers in Nigeria found that they had no 
knowledge of the GFA between Statoil and In-
dustriAll: “Nigerian shop steward at Statoil Ni-
geria was not acquainted with the agreements 
that were supposed to benefi t him and his mem-
bers” (Houeland 2017: 65).
According to the leader of Industri Energi, 
some foreign unions see Norwegian union lead-
ers and union representatives as collaborators 
and untrustworthy, since they not only em-
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phasize social dialogue but also are paid by the 
company to fulfi ll their role. He gave two exam-
ples. In Angola, union leaders claimed that the 
Norwegian union leaders were corrupt, since 
their air tickets were paid for by Equinor (then 
Statoil) and therefore refused to meet them. In 
the United States, union leaders are very skep-
tical of close collaboration with the employers 
and have similarly been reluctant to collaborate 
with Industri Energi. 
In Tanzania, where Statoil/Equinor opened 
a local offi  ce in 2007, union density is low and 
there is little trust in unions. One reason is that 
the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA) 
has a poor history in terms of accountability. In 
both 2009 and 2019, the secretary generals were 
suspended, accused of embezzlement (Babeiya 
2011: 128; Th e Guardian 2019). However, there 
is a long history of aid to Tanzania and Norway 
has historically been one of the main develop-
ment partners meaning that many Tanzanians 
associate Norway with aid. “Partnership” both 
between governmental bodies and between civil 
society organizations in the South and North, 
and “capacity building” have been central to de-
velopment cooperation. Th is history partly ex-
plains why the Industri Energi Equinor branch 
has been met with open arms by the employees 
in Tanzania. 
Equinor in Tanzania 
Equinor has been in Tanzania since 2007 and 
has invested more than 2.1 billion USD in the 
country (Equinor 2020b). In 2012 and 2013, the 
company made enormous gas discoveries in the 
deep sea—the largest abroad in the company’s 
history. Th e company plans to build a liquefi ed 
natural gas (LNG) plant onshore but has not yet 
taken the fi nal investment decision. Th e delay 
in the decision is partly because of changes in 
Tanzania’s regulatory framework, including the 
passing of the Sovereignty Act in 2017, which 
says that the parliament can ask to have con-
tracts renegotiated without international ar-
bitration (Sørreime 2019: 559). As of 2020, 
Equi nor Tanzania only has 30 employees, but 
in 2014 the management envisaged having at 
least a thousand employees within a few years 
and the company invested heavily to build up a 
union branch at its offi  ce.
Unions in Tanzania 
In common with Vietnam and post-socialist 
countries in Eastern Europe, the labor regime 
in Tanzania has changed dramatically over the 
past 50 years. Unions played a central role in 
the struggle for independence, but during the 
one-party era (1977–1992) all unions were co-
opted by the ruling party Chama Cha Mapin-
duzi (CCM; Party of the Revolution). Th e Trade 
Union Act no. 10 of 1998 formally made trade 
unions independent of the government, and 
many independent unions have been formed. 
At the same time, Tanzania opened up for for-
eign investments in the mining sector (Lange 
2011). In 2007, at least a thousand workers, 
some of them trade union leaders, were report-
edly fi red from a mining company aft er striking 
in protest against the wage diff erences between 
foreigners and Tanzanians (Rugeiyamu et al. 
2018). However, the state has also suppressed 
workers’ rights. In both 2010 and 2015, civil 
servants organized under Th e Trade Union 
Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA) were told by 
the president that they would lose their jobs if 
they engaged in strikes (Rugeiyamu et al. 2018: 
46). Labor rights are not mentioned in Tanza-
nia’s guidelines for CSR in the extractive indus-
try (URT 2015). Th is is in contrast to Ghana’s 
Mineral Commission’s guideline for CSR, which 
included workplace and labor standards (Jiao 
2019: 47). 
Despite playing key roles in other African 
countries, such as Nigeria (Atabaki et al. 2018; 
Houeland 2018), South Africa (Webster 2018), 
and Zambia (Larmer 2006), unions have not 
played a signifi cant political role in Tanzania af-
ter the late 1970s. Th ere is lack of “solidarity and 
partnership” among the country’s trade unions 
and opposition parties and trade unions blame 
each other for the lack of interest and unwill-
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ingness to cooperate (Babeiya 2011: 127, 128). 
In the following section, I describe the major 
events during the process of unionization of the 
local Equinor staff  in Tanzania.
Equinor’s and Industri Energi’s 
support to NUMET 
In 2013, the newly established National Union 
of Mine and Energy Workers of Tanzania (NU-
MET), a splinter from Tanzania Mines, En-
ergy, Construction and Allied Workers Union 
(TAMICO), contacted the management of a 
number of mining and petroleum companies 
in Tanzania and asked for a meeting with the 
local staff . Th ey referred to a provision in Tan-
zanian law called Notifi cation to exercise organi-
zational rights. Th ere were varying responses to 
the meeting proposal from diff erent companies: 
British Gas welcomed a meeting, but no mem-
bers joined; the management of ExxonMobil 
never responded; Williamson Diamond mine 
welcomed a meeting, but only aft er a full year of 
discussion. Statoil/Equinor, on the other hand, 
responded quickly and positively. 
Th e Equinor management organized a meet-
ing where NUMET representatives presented 
themselves to the local staff  and encouraged 
them to join the union, but the response from 
Equinor employees was lukewarm. Of the twelve 
Tanzanian staff  members I have talked to, only 
one had been a member of a union before. Th e 
employees referred to the history of unions in 
the country and the misuse of members’ money 
as reasons for why they were not interested in 
joining a union. 
In spring 2014, the Equinor board visited 
Tanzania. Th e Norwegian union representatives 
asked local staff  whether they were unionized. 
Th e answer was no, but they were interested to 
learn from their Norwegian colleagues. One of 
the union board members recalls the kind of 
advice she gave to the Tanzanian staff : “Th ey 
wanted advice and tips, and they knew little 
about the Norwegian culture, how we are orga-
nized. . . . Th ey had no experience with unions, 
but we explained to them: ‘Make a meeting 
place with the management, and don’t address 
the most diffi  cult issues fi rst.’”
Aft er witnessing the role the Norwegian 
union representatives played in the Equinor 
board, some of the Tanzanian staff  contacted 
NUMET and asked for a new meeting. Th e 
new meeting took place in August 2014 and 23 
of the 26 employees in attendance joined the 
trade union, and branch leadership was elected. 
In December 2014, a recognition agreement 
with Equinor was signed, but during the wage 
negotiation the parties held vastly diff erent 
views. 
When I discussed the fi rst wage negotiation 
with the Norwegian members of the Statoil 
Tanzania management, they smiled in disbelief 
and described it as a “catastrophe.” Th e union 
demanded a 150 percent wage increase, but 
ended up with just 3 percent. Th e local under-
standing and reception (Behrends et al. 2014) 
of the wage negotiation model was substantially 
diff erent from the Norwegian original, where, 
at least over the last twenty years, a demand for 
a 150 percent wage increase would be unheard 
of. One does get the impression however, that 
the management did not take into account that 
in Norway, wage negotiations are part of the 
“income-political settlements” (inntektspolitiske 
oppgjør) where the deals include “not only sala-
ries but also comprehensive adjustments of the 
welfare system, pensions” and more (Knudsen, 
Rajak, et al. this issue). 
In Tanzania, there is a very limited welfare 
system and public services are generally of poor 
quality. In interviews, branch union leadership 
explained that they were very content with the 
medical insurance that Equinor off ered, but 
that they felt that the Norwegian management 
did not fully understand the economic burden 
of private education in the country. One of the 
other foreign investors in the country, in their 
negotiations with a rival union, has agreed to 
support school fees for the employees’ children 
as part of the wage package. Th e fact that unions 
may lobby for benefi ts other than wages is not 
unique for Tanzania. In Brazil, the union orga-
nizing the workers at Hydro similarly asked for 
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economic support for education and housing 
(Christensen 2011). 
One reason why such support is far more at-
tractive in Tanzania than a general pay raise is 
expectations from the extended family. It may 
be hard for a worker to send his/her children to 
a good, private school, and not do the same for 
one’s nephews or nieces whose parents are less 
fortunate. When school fees are covered directly 
by the company, the employees escape such 
moral dilemmas. At the same time, companies 
that enter such agreements do to some extent 
take over the role of state, and thereby increase 
their infl uence and power in the societies where 
they operate (Ferguson 2005; Rajak 2016). In 
interviews, the Equinor management was very 
clear that their role as a company in Tanzania 
should not be confused with aid or replacing 
government authorities.
However, since both the managers of Equi-
nor and the Norwegian union representatives 
appear to conceptualize the Norwegian model 
as close collaboration between the company 
management and one, strong union that rep-
resents the workers—and not as a tripartite 
system where the state plays an important role, 
including in off ering universal welfare—they 
fail to fully understand the requests and de-
mands from union members in Tanzania.
Aft er the fi rst wage negotiation between 
Equinor Tanzania and the NUMET branch, the 
management decided that it was important to 
increase Tanzanian staff ’s knowledge of indus-
trial relations in Norway. As one of the Norwe-
gian based Corporate People and Leadership 
(PL) staff  members diplomatically put it: “Th ey 
had a bit diff erent way of working, that’s why 
they were invited here.” Equinor Tanzania asked 
Industri Energi to act as a mediator of the trav-
eling model, and invited the four members of 
the branch leadership, together with Equinor’s 
human resources (HR) manager in Tanzania 
to Norway for a weeks-long visit in September 
2015. Th e trip was paid for by Equinor but orga-
nized in cooperation with Industri Energi who 
said that they all “agreed that there was a need to 
build a culture of cooperation.” Industry Ener-
gi’s support to the NUMET branch was funded 
by the union’s international solidarity fund. 
During the visit, the NUMET Equinor branch 
leadership held meetings with the branch lead-
ership at Equinor. Th e PowerPoint presenta-
tion was titled “Tanzania Visiting Statoil: Union 
Meeting, Discussion and Capacity Building,” re-
fl ecting the perception that a transfer of knowl-
edge from Norway to Tanzania was central to 
the process. To many Tanzanians, this is a well-
known format. Th rough decades of development 
cooperation, civil society organizations and gov-
ernment entities from the Global North have 
off ered countless capacity-building programs 
and seminars to Tanzanian institutions, organi-
zations, and individuals, and as Behrends et al. 
have pointed out, those who support or sponsor 
a traveling model oft en advocate for “responsi-
ble” handling of the traveling model (2014: 33).
Th e union off ering this specifi c capacity-
building seminar was a member of the Nor-
wegian confederation of trade unions (LO-
Norway). Some years earlier, LO-Norway was 
funded by Norwegian aid money to carry out 
a project that aimed to share experiences with 
democratic decision-making processes through 
the Oil for Development program. Th erefore, 
they had experience with such forms of capac-
ity building (Løken 2014). Th e main themes 
presented included the tripartite collabora-
tion model, the Industrial Democracy law of 
1973 that gives “the employees representation 
in company steering bodies,” membership 
and organization of the union, and the Global 
Framework Agreement of 1998 (Industri Energi 
Statoil 2015).
Th e guests were also invited to the headquar-
ters of Industri Energi and TEKNA (a union for 
civil engineers) and had meetings with Equinor’s 
safety representatives, and the employers’ rep-
resentative, the Confederation of Norwegian 
Enterprise (Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon, 
NHO). Th ey also had a dinner with the staff  
representative on the Equinor board. According 
to the PL representative, “they gained a better 
understanding of the fact that this is interaction 
(samhandling).”
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Having invested in building knowledge and 
understanding among the branch leadership, 
the Equinor Tanzania management decided it 
was time to initiate a closer relationship with 
NUMETs central offi  ce. Th erefore, in November 
2015 a delegation of ten persons from Equinor 
Tanzania, including the Norwegian Country 
Manager and the Norwegian HR manager, 
traveled by plane to Mwanza (1,110 kilome-
ters from Dar es Salaam) to meet with the NU-
MET national leadership, which is based in the 
country’s main mining area. Th e little splinter 
organization had never experienced anything 
similar. Th e great majority of their members 
work at large-scale mines owned by multina-
tional corporations and have previously experi-
enced companies attempting to crush them. 
Foreign companies use both carrots and 
sticks to crush unions in Tanzania. An expat 
manager of a mining/drilling company shared 
his strategies for keeping membership in NU-
MET at a minimum. He explained that NUMET 
had managed to get 40 percent of his workers 
to join the union at the beginning of 2017. Un-
der Tanzanian law the unions have the right to 
collective bargaining when they have 50 percent 
membership. He started eff orts to reduce union 
activities: “I organize English language training 
for my local staff ,” he said, and added: “Doing 
small things like that keeps them away from the 
union.” In addition to free language training, 
he off ered them a good pay raise and told the 
workers that they could not hold union meet-
ings on work premises. He succeeded in getting 
the membership rate down to zero by the end of 
the year. Winding up his success story, he con-
cluded triumphantly: “I got rid of them!” 
In light of such experiences, Equinor’s visit 
was a very special event for the NUMET leader-
ship. In the words of one of the Norwegians: “To 
them, it was like having the king visit!” NUMET 
decided to make the most of this unusual visit 
and invited four television broadcasters, and 
fi ve newspapers to report on the visit. Th ey also 
hired a professional fi lmmaker to record the 
events—the resulting fi lm is similar to the usual 
genre the company produces: wedding videos. 
Accompanied by romantic music, we see the 
NUMET and Equinor staff  visiting one of the 
few tourist attractions in the city, a small island 
in Lake Victoria with a zoo. We later see them in 
more “corporate” surroundings, in the meeting 
room inside the hotel. 
In all countries, but particularly in one of the 
world’s poorest countries, prospective union 
members may be attracted to the union that ap-
pears to have good alliances and support from 
abroad. Th is explains why it was so important 
for NUMET to showcase their cooperation with 
Equinor as broadly as possible in the media 
and to have a professional videographer docu-
ment the event. As a splinter union, NUMET 
competes with the much stronger Tanzania 
Mines, Energy, Construction and Allied Work-
ers’ Union (TAMICO). TAMICO is a member 
of the federation TUCTA, which is aligned 
with the ruling party. LO-Norway and Indus-
tri Energi have supported TUCTA through the 
Norwegian aid program, Oil for Development 
(OfU; Olje for Utvikling).5 Th is is an example of 
how support from international NGOs or global 
unions empower some organizations, and thus 
indirectly disempower other groups (Zajak et al. 
2017: 908), in this case independent unions like 
NUMET. 
According to the former HR manager at 
Equinor Tanzania, the visit to NUMET’s head-
quarters was a strategic decision by Equinor. 
At that point, the management envisaged that 
Equinor Tanzania would grow to encompass a 
thousand employees within a relatively short 
time. “We leaned on the same experience and 
philosophy as in Norway,” he explained. An 
Equinor union representative based in Norway, 
who met the NUMET representatives during 
their visit to Norway, similarly emphasized the 
Norwegian experiences as a central factor for 
their work with unions abroad: “In the early 
years of the oil industry in Norway, there were 
many in-house unions (husforeninger), and 
they went on strike heedlessly.” She explained 
how Hydro (established in 1905) had experi-
ence with industrial workers for more than a 
hundred years, and therefore avoided such in-
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house unions: “Th ings were tidy and orderly . . . 
this is what we envisage down there as well—it 
so much better to have one union only—so we 
tried to follow the Norwegian model.” Again, we 
see how some actors refer to the close collabo-
ration between industry management and trade 
unions as “the Norwegian model,” and appear 
to disregard the more common, wide concep-
tualizations of the Nordic/Norwegian model 
that see the state as central (Ervasti et al. 2008; 
Løken and Barbosa 2008). Th e union represen-
tative also associates “the Norwegian model” 
with having one trade union representing the 
employees. In actual fact, there are two unions 
organizing oil workers in Norway. Industri En-
ergi’s competitor, SAFE, was originally named 
OFS and was set up by Phillips as a company 
union in an attempt to keep out the unions af-
fi liated with LO-Norway. However, through a 
number of strikes between 1978 and 1981, OFS 
became radicalized (Ryggvik 2012), and this 
union does not nurture the close collaboration 
with Equinor that Industri Energi does. 
For Equinor Tanzania, which envisaged hav-
ing thousands of employees, the prospect of col-
laborating with one union rather than a number 
of smaller ones was attractive. An additional 
factor that may have spurred Equinor Tanzania 
to make eff orts to establish a good relationship 
with NUMET is that MNCs have a bad repu-
tation regarding labor relations in Tanzania. 
Sarag Lauwo and Olatunde Julius Otusanya 
note that foreign companies’ abuse of workers’ 
rights has attracted “considerable criticism from 
NGOs, trade unions and the media” (2014: 96, 
101). Equinor Tanzania’s management are very 
conscious that negative news about Equinor in 
Tanzanian media would reach Norwegian head-
lines very quickly, particularly given the close 
relationship between the two countries aft er 50 
years of development cooperation.
It has been argued that MNCs are less mon-
itored in the Global South than in the North 
or their home countries. However, due to sub-
stantial donor funding of NGOs since the late 
1980s, Tanzania is a country with a relatively 
strong civil society (disregarding the weak trade 
unions). When the contracts that Equinor and 
ExxonMobil had signed with the government in 
2007 were leaked in 2014, there was a media de-
bate where several infl uential people requested 
that the contracts be reviewed (Borchrevink 
2019; Sørreime 2019: 559). In the event that 
Equi nor invest in Tanzania and have thousands 
of employees, a serious labor confl ict would 
probably be addressed by Tanzanian civil soci-
ety organizations (CSOs) and Tanzanian media, 
in a similar manner to the local coverage of la-
bor confl icts within the mining sector. Equinor’s 
investment in the union branch must be seen in 
this context as well.
Th ere have been serious confl icts within the 
NUMET branch at Equinor Tanzania. Many of 
the members felt that the union leadership was 
too confl ict oriented, “fi ghting with the manage-
ment.” In February 2016, the branch leadership 
was overthrown by the members. Tanzanian 
staff  members praise the new branch leader 
as being “cooperative” and “calm” (mpole) and 
collaborating well with the management, rather 
than fi ghting them. Th e majority of branch 
members were in favor of dialogue rather than a 
combative stance, and thus embraced a reform-
ist style of unionism. 
News of the confl ict reached the Industri En-
ergi Equinor branch, which asked for an update 
on behalf of the International Aff airs section 
of the Federal Union (LO-Norway).6 Th e new 
NUMET leadership put together a brief report 
where they introduced themselves and their 
backgrounds, and also stated that only ten of 
22 local staff  were members, which meant that 
they did not qualify for a collective bargaining 
agreement under Tanzanian law. Th e report 
from the NUMET branch to their partners in 
Industri Energi from August 2016 lists six pri-
ority areas of the branch: “Ensure good cooper-
ation at all times with DPI TAN in supporting 
TGP; competence development using Statoil 
experience working with the unions; continue 
to build skills in union management within Sta-
toil environment; establish cooperation with 
Statoil corporate union leadership; continue 
promoting better employer/employee relations; 
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continue promoting/initiating cultural bridg-
ing programs” (NUMET 2016). Th e fi rst item 
on the list is to ensure “good cooperation at all 
times with DPI TAN [Development and Pro-
duction International Tanzania] in supporting 
TGP [Tanzania Gas Project].” Th e very fi rst item 
on the list of priorities of the local union branch, 
then, is to ensure good cooperation with the 
management. 
Th e Equinor management and employees 
in Tanzania have, to a large degree, adopted a 
model of close collaboration between manage-
ment and the union branch. Th e collaboration 
model fi ts well with the national ethos in Tanza-
nia that emphasizes living together in peace in 
a context of great cultural diversity, and which 
cherishes the ability to cooperate well across 
ethnic and religious lines. At the same time, the 
union branch is still far from its original goal of 
a collective bargaining agreement. Th e branch 
leadership told me that the motivation for 
union work had subsided as a consequence of 
the confl ict between the former branch leaders 
and the branch members. 
Th e HR manager at Equinor Tanzania also 
admitted that the company’s engagement for 
getting the staff  unionized had been reduced 
now that the investment in Tanzania was less 
certain. As he put it, “there is no longer a busi-
ness case” for securing the long-term rights of 
the employees. Th e Oslo-based Norwegian PL 
leader, who works closely with the Tanzanian 
HR leader in the same leadership group, argued 
along the same lines: Equinor will commit itself 
as little as possible as long as the fi nal invest-
ment decision has not been taken. Th ese state-
ments demonstrate that although Equinor has 
committed itself to international agreements, 
and although many Norwegian employees talk 
of exporting what they refer to as the “Norwe-
gian model,” there is a limit to the commitments 
that Equinor Tanzania is willing to make. 
In the small and simple offi  ces that house 
the NUMET headquarters in Mwanza, enlarged 
gold framed photos of the visit by the Equinor 
delegation hold a prominent place. In an in-
terview, the General Secretary admitted that 
the union has not achieved very much in their 
collaboration with Equinor, but emphasized 
the need to balance: “Th ere are so many trade 
unions; if you frustrate the employer, they can 
call any other trade union.” His statement clearly 
illustrates the unequal power relationship be-
tween corporations and unions in Tanzania, 
and his experience that it is oft en the company 
that determines which union the employees are 
members of.
NUMET’s General Secretary started NUMET 
as a splinter union aft er having lived and worked 
in South Africa and being inspired by union 
work there. In his youth, he went to a Tanza-
nian school that received Norwegian aid funds, 
and his perception is that Equinor, as a Norwe-
gian company, is diff erent from other MNCs. 
He stresses that unions in other countries have 
“contributed to improving performance and 
benefi ts to the employees and the investors,” and 
that ideally, unions and companies should be 
“business partners.” Th e statement that unions 
are “business partners” to the employers is sim-
ilar to the reformist or social democratic think-
ing that Industri Energi and Equinor represent. 
NUMET’s General Secretary’s statement 
about being “business partners” stands in clear 
contrast to NUMET’s web presentation where 
NUMET presents itself as a radical union: “Th e 
history of the National Union of Mine and En-
ergy Workers of Tanzania (NUMET) is a history 
of class struggle. Th is struggle is embedded in 
the inherent contradictions that exist between 
capital and labor but also the struggle against 
colonialism” (NUMET 2020). 
In their ethnographic studies of labor pol-
itics in Kazakhstan and India, Eeva Kesküla 
and Andrew Sanchez found that union leaders 
tend to make “emotive appeals to languages of 
struggle that they are usually unable to fulfi l in 
their daily activities” (2019: 112). In the case of 
NUMET, this gap between ideal and practice 
may be the pragmatic compromise of a poor 
and marginalized union that receives economic 
support from some of the larger corporations 
(including Equinor), but does not have any ties 
to the national federation TUCTA. Together 
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with other splinter/independent unions, NU-
MET is trying to establish a new federation, 
Tanzania Federation of Free Trade Unions, as an 
alternative to TUCTA. However, at the time of 
writing, the only formal ties “upward” that the 
NUMET Equinor branch has is to NUMET cen-
trally (Mwanza). Th ere are no formal links to a 
national federation, nor to the global federation, 
IndustryAll. 
In principle, the ILO and the Norwegian fed-
eration are strong supporters of a unifi ed labor 
movement and disapprove of new independent 
unions or splinter unions. In practice however, 
the Norwegian federation, through their mem-
ber unions, cooperates with independent or 
splinter unions in both Tanzania and Brazil. 
Th e NUMET branch’s ties to the Equinor 
branch of Industri Energi (Oslo) are infor-
mal, and there is no Global Work Council for 
Equinor. Within the EU, the law mandates Euro-
pean Works Councils, which enable employees 
to contribute to the “decision-making process 
in transnational issues” (ILO 2009: 770). In-
spired by the role of European Works Councils, 
three initiatives have been taken to establish a 
Global Works Council for Equinor. First, LO-
Norway has requested Norad (the Norwegian 
aid agency) to provide pilot funds to start a 
Global Works Council for Equinor staff  in the 
diff erent countries where the company has op-
erations. A motivation for spending aid money 
on this was the fact that Equinor has operations 
in several developing countries, but the initia-
tive was not granted support.7 Second, Indus-
tri Energi has sought to integrate the idea of a 
Global Work Council in their Global Frame-
work Agreement (GFA) with Equinor, but 
Equinor has refused to do so. Th ird, the three 
union representatives of the Equinor board 
have raised the issue of a Global Work Council 
in board meetings, but have not succeeded in 
getting support for this initiative. 
Internationalization of employment tends 
to fragment worker representation. As Rob-
ert Scholz and Sigurt Vitols have pointed out, 
the “lower the proportion of employees in the 
‘home’ country of a multinational, the more 
diffi  cult it is to organize workers’ voice, given 
the diversity of national industrial relations” 
(Scholz and Vitols 2019: 236). A Global Work 
Council for Equinor employees would have 
given the Tanzanian representatives a platform 
for learning from unions that are more sim-
ilar to themselves than Industri Energi, and it 
would have given them a very diff erent form 
of bargaining power across borders. However, 
the company was very resistant to this idea, and 
therefore the union representatives no longer 
see it as a realistic goal. Th is indicates that al-
though Equinor has signed a Global Framework 
Agreement with IndustriAll, there are clear lim-
its to how far the corporation is willing to go in 
terms of cooperation with unions in their global 
operations. 
Th is is possibly related to Equinor’s assess-
ment of risk, where “labor strikes” are listed 
among the operational risks that the company 
may face.8 In Nigeria in 2012, oil workers forced 
the government to withdraw planned cuts in 
subsidies by threatening to strike (Houeland 
2018). In Norway, there were a number of 
strikes in the oil sector in the 1970s and 1980s, 
including a shutdown of production. In 2012, 
when Equinor (then Statoil) wanted to remove 
the option of voluntary retirement at the age 
of 62 with a very attractive pension, more than 
seven hundred oil workers went on strike. Ap-
proximately two weeks later, the employers an-
nounced that they would organize a lockout of 
union members, but the government decided to 
force the parties to compulsory arbitration. Th e 
ILO was very critical of this (IndustriAll 2012). 
Th is case illustrates how the Nordic/Norwegian 
tripartite system enables the state to intervene 
in labor confl icts that are perceived to threaten 
broader societal interests. It also shows that pre-
senting “the Norwegian model” as a question of 
cooperation and dialogue between corporations 
and trade unions—as many of the Norwegian 
Equinor staff  and union representatives did 
when talking of a transfer of the model to Tan-
zania—represents a very narrow understand-
ing, since it omits the role of the state, which is 
central to how the tripartite system functions in 
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Norway (Ervasti et al. 2008; Løken and Barbosa 
2008).
Equinor Tanzania currently has only twenty 
local employees, all of them offi  ce workers, 
and union work is not high on the agenda. If 
Equinor decides to invest in Tanzania however, 
and starts production, it will be an advantage for 
the company to have a union branch in place 
that sees cooperation with the management as 
central to its mandate. 
Conclusion 
Th is article has demonstrated the way the Nor-
wegian energy company Equinor actively sup-
ported the establishment of a union branch at its 
offi  ce in Tanzania. During this process, close co-
operation and dialogue between company man-
agement and union branches (and upward to 
unions and federations) was referred to as “the 
Norwegian model.” Th e case study is yet another 
example of “traveling rationality,” where a social 
mode is transferred from one context to another, 
but where only the “objectifi ed model” travels 
(Behrends et al. 2014: 2; Craig and Porter 2006). 
Norwegian union representatives at federal 
and company levels, as well as representatives 
for Equinor HR, talk warmly of “the Norwe-
gian model” and how benefi cial it is for both 
the company and its employees. Th e “objecti-
fi ed model” they refer to emphasizes trust and 
cooperation between employers and employ-
ees, while the scholarly and political concep-
tions of the Nordic/Norwegian model—which 
focus on the central role of the state in this 
cooperation through the “income-political set-
tlements” (inntektspolitiske oppgjør) and the 
state’s role in securing universal welfare—are 
undercommunicated. 
To the Tanzanian staff , the idea of capac-
ity building and learning from Norway was a 
well-known scenario. It was also attractive, fi rst 
because they hoped that unionization would se-
cure them substantially higher wages and pos-
sibly other benefi ts like support for education 
for their children, but also because the trips to 
Norway were attractive on both economic and 
social terms. 
Within Industri Energi and the Norwegian 
section of the MNC, the view that cooperation 
is benefi cial to both workers and the corpora-
tion is hegemonic. I argue that through their 
support for union work in Tanzania, Equinor, 
in close collaboration with Industri Energi, 
has managed to transfer this norm quite suc-
cessfully. Aft er some turmoil, the local union 
branch states that their main priority is “good 
cooperation at all times” with the management. 
Trade unions do discipline workers (Houeland 
2018), and I argue that up to now, the company 
appears to have benefi ted from their support for 
the establishment of a local union branch. To 
what degree the unionized workers have bene-
fi ted is an open question. Th e members have not 
succeeded in their goal of having a collective 
bargaining agreement, and a system of social 
dialogue that includes the Tanzanian state is not 
realistic because the union that the Tanzanian 
staff  are members of, NUMET, is a split union 
that has no ties upward. 
Th at being said, the oil sector is generally 
characterized by contractors and contingent 
work (Atabaki et al. 2018), and the present 
and future employees of Equinor Tanzania are 
in a better position being organized than not. 
Equinor’s willingness and eff orts to support 
the establishment of a union branch in Tanza-
nia is laudable, but as I have shown, it is closely 
connected to Norwegian corporate democracy 
and Equinor’s close ties with Industri Energi, to 
which it is accountable. A pivotal point in the 
process was the Equinor board’s visit to Tanza-
nia, where the union representatives contacted 
the Tanzanian staff . Without this visit, the local 
staff  of Equinor Tanzania might have remained 
unorganized. Equinor’s support for unioniza-
tion was probably a result of several factors, in-
cluding Equinor’s CSR policies, which include 
labor rights, an assessment that unionization 
of its Tanzanian staff  would be benefi cial for 
the company, as well as codetermination and 
the company’s accountability to the Norwegian 
union Industri Energi. Th is case demonstrates 
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that a Norwegian MNC may do things quite 
diff erently from other MNCs. However, the de-
gree to which this happens is partly contingent 
on coincidences—like where the board happens 
to pay a visit at a specifi c time, and local char-
acteristics like whether the local union culture 
is reformist, emphasizing social dialogue, as in 
Norway, or radical, and therefore rejecting the 
“Norwegian way.” 
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Notes
 1. Some of the interviews were recorded (with 
consent), but for the great majority I took hand-
written notes and the quotes may therefore not 
be verbatim in the strict sense.
 2. Th e union has 60,000 members and has a his-
tory of negotiating very good conditions for its 
members working off -shore.
 3. IndustriAll Global Union. 2018. http://www.in
dustriall-union.org/ (accessed 25 July 2020).
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www.equinor.com/en/about-us/organisation
.html.
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